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Abstract
We investigate the cost of capital in a model with an agency conflict between inside
managers and outside shareholders.  Inside ownership reflects the classic tradeoff
between incentives and risk diversification, and the severity of agency costs depends on a
parameter representing investor protection.  In equilibrium, the marginal cost of capital is a
weighted average of terms reflecting both idiosyncratic and systematic risk, and weaker
investor protection increases the weight on idiosyncratic risk.  Using firm-level data from
38 countries, we estimate the p redicted relationships among investor protection, inside
ownership, and the marginal cost of capital.  We discuss implications for the determinants
of firm size, the relationship between Tobin's Q and ownership, and the effect of financial
liberalizations.
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In this paper, we investigate the e¤ect of investor protection on the cost of capital, where
“investor protection” refers collectively to those features of the legal, institutional, and
regulatory environment – and characteristics of …rms or projects – that facilitate …nancial
contracting between inside owners (managers) and outside investors. Building on the agency
framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and ideas from the law and …nance literature
(e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny – “LLSV”, 1998), we investigate the
empirical implications of investor protection using structural equations derived from a model
of inside ownership and investment. In the model, insiders can divert value (or “steal”) from
outside investors at a cost which depends on the exogenous level of investor protection and
the endogenous fraction of equity owned by insiders. Endogenous ownership incentives
are expensive to provide, however, for the familiar reason that insiders are forced to bear
undiversi…ed idiosyncratic risk. If the exogenous level of investor protection were perfect,
insiders would optimally choose to sell 100% of the equity (to diversify fully idiosyncratic
risk) and steal nothing, but with imperfect investor protection, this contract cannot be
(costlessly) enforced. By retaining a higher fraction of equity, insiders can credibly commit
to lower rates of stealing, but are forced to bear higher levels of diversi…able risk.
The tradeo¤ between risk and incentives distorts insiders’ incentive to invest in risky
capital projects, even under the optimal ownership structure. This is because the cost of
capital includes an additional premium for holding idiosyncratic risk which is absent when
investor protection allows insiders to diversify fully. Thus the model determines not only
the endogenous structure of ownership structure but also the endogenously determined cost
of capital and level of capital investment. Our empirical strategy exploits the equilibrium
relationship between inside ownership and the marginal return on capital implied by the
model. In countries like the United States where investor protection is high, the model
predicts endogenously low levels of insider ownership. Accordingly, the idiosyncratic risk
2premium applied to the cost of capital is low, and the steady-state level of capital approaches
the …rst best level of e¢ciency that would obtain in the absence of …nancial contracting costs.
In countries like Turkey or Peru, however, where investor protections are ostensibly weaker,
the optimal ownership structure obliges insiders to hold large equity stakes and therefore
bear large amounts of idiosyncratic risk, which implies steady-state levels of capital below
the …rst-best level.
While the model helps to formalize our intuition, it more importantly formalizes the
empirical speci…cation used to investigate the predicted relationship among investor pro-
tection, inside ownership concentration, and the cost of capital. Using …rm-level data from
Worldscope for 38 countries, we investigate two predictions. First, we estimate the determi-
nants of the fraction of equity owned by insiders. We verify that, as predicted, this fraction
depends on measures of investor protection. We emphasize that investor protection has an
important cross–…rm dimension in addition to its more familiar cross-country dimension.
Assets like factories that are di¢cult to steal provide a built-in degree of investor protec-
tion, whereas assets like the insiders’ accumulated knowledge of the product market may be
easier to expropriate if these employees can leave to start their own …rms.1 This cross-…rm
variation of investor protection can also explain the cross-sectional di¤erences in the level
of inside ownership observed, say, within the United States.
Second, and more important, we document a positive correlation between inside equity
ownership and the marginal return to capital, a relationship which follows directly from
the …rst-order condition for capital. The cost of capital in the …rst-order condition capital
includes a risk premium that re‡ects the insiders’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk. The higher
the equilibrium level of inside ownership, the higher the risk premium in the marginal cost
of capital. This explains the positive relationship between the marginal return to capital
and inside ownership. In addition to providing a test of the above qualitative prediction,
1For additional examples of the “tunneling” schemes available to insiders to expropriate wealth from
investors, see LLSV (2000a).
3this equation allows us to obtain estimates of the steady-state risk premium. We estimate
average premiums in the range of zero to …ve percent. Incorporating this value into the
model and using the observed levels of inside ownership allows us to assess the magnitude
of the capital distortions implied by weak investor protection. Though we consider these
estimates and calculations exploratory, they imply that capital stock levels in countries with
weak investor protections are less than half the level implied for countries like the United
States and the United Kingdom.
1.1 Related Research
The research agenda that began with the pioneering work of Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
and Jensen and Meckling (1976) has …rmly established agency theory as a basic building
block of corporate …nance, but there have few attempts to integrate production theory with
the agency theory of corporate …nancial behavior in a uni…ed model of the …rm suitable
for structural empirical estimation. In this paper we derive a simple empirical model that
builds on the recent work of Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), LLSV (1998, 1999),
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000). Like these papers, our goal is to understand the e¤ect
of investor protection on real and …nancial behavior. We borrow from these papers the
assumption that “investor protection” can be modeled as a parameter in a cost-of-stealing
technology that makes it costly (to varying degrees) for insiders with control over the …rm’s
decision-making process to “steal” from outside (minority) shareholders. In contrast to
the above models, we interpret investor protection as a parameter that varies not only
across countries but also across …rms. Consistent with standard agency models, but in
further contrast to the previous research, we introduce insider risk aversion as the o¤setting
cost of insider ownership. Integrating this agency model of ownership with a conventional
production technology generates the basic insight for the cost of capital, and our emphasis
on this dimension of the problem is the primary distinguishing characteristic of our paper.
In further contrast to previous research, we use the model to derive and estimate structural
4equations that we use to help understand the implications of unobserved heterogeneity
resulting from the econometrician’s incomplete measurement of investor protection. We
also use the model to estimate the size of the additional risk premium in the marginal cost
of capital, and use this to calculate the magnitude of investment distortions at the …rm
level.
There is a large literature recently surveyed by Hubbard (1998) which examines the
extent to which investment decisions are a¤ected by …nancial frictions. A recent paper by
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) investigates whether such frictions are related to
country-level measures of …nancial development and investor protection. They …nd that
the fraction of …rms growing faster than a “benchmark” model of unconstrained growth
is positively related to indicators of …nancial development. Love (2001) estimates Euler
equations and similarly …nds that the marginal cost of funds also depends on country-
level measures of investor protection. Both of these papers recognize the importance of
using model structure to control for investment opportunities, but like previous research
(Whited, 1992; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998), such models are truly structural only
under the null hypothesis of frictionless capital markets. Under the alternative hypothesis
of …nancial frictions, the “…nancial side” of such models generally consists of little more
than ad hoc model assumptions such as, for example, that the cost of capital is increasing
in leverage and dividends are constrained to be non-negative. In this paper, by contrast,
ownership structure and leverage are endogenous, and the additional “wedge” for external
equity derives from the underlying agency costs. Moreover, the magnitude of this wedge is
endogenously re‡ected by ownership structure. This result follows directly from the …rst-
order conditions of a simple model and represents an empirical prediction which previous
work has apparently not explored, namely, the predicted relationship between the marginal
pro…t of capital and inside ownership.
Our framework sheds light on the structural interpretation of “ownership-performance”
regressions of the sort estimated, for example, by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), MÁrck, Shleifer,
5and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999),
and Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan (1999). Our model suggest interpretations of these
regression results which di¤er sharply from those that have been suggested in past work
(including our own), and more generally highlight the dangers of failing to recognize fully
the joint endogeneity of ownership variables and balance sheet ratios.
Our focus on the relationship between investor protection and the cost of capital comple-
ments research which has attempted to determine whether cross-country variation in …nan-
cial development is associated with investment and growth rates across countries, industries,
and …rms. A large body of research documents a link between …nancial development and
economic growth using aggregate data (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998;
Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998; Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; and Beck, Levine,
and Loyaza, 2000). Rajan and Zingales (1998) use industry growth in the United States as
a proxy for the investment opportunities of similar industries outside the United States to
show that industries in countries with lower levels of …nancial development grow at slower
rates. Consistent with these results, Wurgler (2000) uses industry data to show that the
sensitivity of investment growth to value added growth (i.e., investment opportunities) is
lower in countries with poorly developed …nancial markets.
The results in this paper are also related (though less directly) to research which seeks
to understand the role of ownership rights for investor protection (Grossman and Hart,
1988; Stulz, 1988; Zwiebel, 1996; Fluck, 1998; and Myers, 2000).2 For example, one-share,
one-vote rules – which are often cited as being good for investor protection – have been
analyzed in detail by Grossman and Hart (1988). The cost-of-stealing model used here
does not explicitly model control rights, but we nevertheless view control considerations as
an important determinant of the exogenous level of investor protection.3 Finally, there is
2Identifying the sources of investor protection is one of the primary questions in the research on corporate
governance recently surveyed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
3Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) consider a model in which both cash ‡ow and control rights are used
to provide incentives for managers. They point out that the free-rider problem by target shareholders limits
6a related literature which emphasizes the role of the legal system for investor protection.
Levine (1999), for example, argues that the legal system is a key determinant of both
…nancial development and economic growth, while LLSV (1997, 1998) and Co¤ee (2000)
argue that common law systems provide stronger investor protection than civil law systems.
The empirical model in this paper does not attempt to formalize the workings of alternative
legal regimes; this is well beyond our scope. Instead, we summarize the e¤ect of the legal
system by positing an empirical mapping from observable features of the legal environment
into a single parameter indexing the “cost of stealing,” i.e., the level of investor protection.
As we show, this characterization of the contracting environment does not necessarily limit
our ability to assess many qualitative and quantitative implications of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in section 2 by introducing
a simple model from which we derive implications for ownership and the cost of capital.
Section 3 explores econometric issues that arise in the speci…cation of the empirical model,
followed by empirical results in section 4. Section 5 discusses some interesting implications
and applications, and section 6 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider the two-period problem confronting an entrepreneur (alternately “manager” or
“insider”) who is initially endowed with liquid wealth Wit and a project which yields a total
return of ¦(Kit;µit),w h e r eKit denotes the stock of …xed capital. For simplicity, we assume
there are no adjustment costs, and normalize the purchase price of capital to one; we add
adjustment costs later in the empirical speci…cation. In the …rst period, the entrepreneur
can sell equity or borrow to …nance capital expenditures, Kit, and consumption, Cit.E q u i t y
…nancing Xit is raised by selling claims to a fraction 1￿ ®it of future dividends. Borrowing
the incentive properties of disciplinary takeovers, and therefore tends to favor using cash ‡ow rights to align
insider incentives. Their results provide some justi…cation for our simpli…ed model in which the allocation
of cash ‡ow rights is endogenous, but the allocation of control rights is captured by the cost-of-stealing
function.
7(or saving) occurs at the rate rt+1. The borrowing-saving rate need not be riskless (e.g.,
the manager can invest in the market portfolio), but we assume the return cannot be made
contingent on the idiosyncratic outcome of the …rm. This assumption is important, and
is meant to capture the intuition that equity (and not debt) is the natural instrument for
sharing the …rm’s idiosyncratic risk.
The agency problem between insiders and outsiders arises because insiders can steal or
divert a fraction sit+1 of …rm pro…ts to themselves before paying dividends. The manager
cannot costlessly commit in period one to the level of stealing in period two. Stealing is,
however, discouraged by an exogenous punishment technology which imposes a monetary
cost c(Áit;s it)=1
2Áits2
it. The parameter Áit is therefore a quantitative index of investor
protection, where higher parameter values impose a higher cost of stealing, and therefore
indicate better protection. The parameter Áit is easy to interpret because it is proportional
to the cost of stealing; to double the cost of stealing, for example, we double Áit:4 Under
this functional form assumption, the total and marginal costs of stealing are increasing in
Áit,s ot h a tcÁ > 0 and csÁ > 0. This functional form also has the intuitively appealing
property that the cost of stealing be convex in sit.
According to the model, “investor protection” is anything that exogenously increases
the cost to insiders of stealing from outsiders. In particular, the model does not distinguish
…rm-level and country-level determinants of investor protection; the parameter Áit is meant
to summarize the net impact of all features of the contracting environment. Thus a …rm
operating hard-to-steal assets in a country with weak legal enforcement could have insider
ownership levels comparable to a …rm operating easy-to-steal assets in a country with strong
legal enforcement.5 Our empirical speci…cation for inside equity ownership explicitly allows
4If the probability of disciplinary takeover were a cost of stealing, and if voting rights were exogenously
tied to dividend rights, one could argue that the takeover probability is an increasing function of 1 ￿ ´i®it,
where ´i ¸ 0 is an inverse index of the e¤ectiveness of the market for corporate control. This would imply




it (1 ￿ ´i®it). We assume the probability
disciplinary takeovers does not much depend on the allocation of dividend rights (that is, Áit > 0 and ´i =0 ).
Arguments in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) are consistent with this assumption.
5Another …rm-level characteristic on which investor protection might also depend is the identity of the
8for such cases.
To the extent that insiders own equity in the …rm, they only steal from themselves. In-
side ownership of equity therefore provides a mechanism with which managers can commit
to lower levels of future stealing. Under the above assumptions, stealing at the rate sit gener-
ates adirect bene…tof (sit ￿ c(Áit;s it))¦(Kit;µ it) for insiders, and leaves (1 ￿ sit)¦(Kit;µit)
to be divided up among shareholders (including the inside shareholders). The manager’s
net return Nit+1 in period t +1from operating the …rm is therefore:
Nit+1 =[ ®it (1 ￿ sit+1)+sit+1 ￿ c(Áit;s it+1)]¦(Kit+1;µit+1): (1)
Equity proceeds raised from outside investors must guarantee (in expectation) the mar-
ket rate of return. If investors value next-period cash ‡ows according to the stochastic
discount factor Mt+1, the proceeds from selling a fraction 1￿ ®it of the equity is given by:
Xit = Et [Mt+1 (1 ￿ ®it)((1￿ sit+1)¦(Kit+1;µit+1))]: (2)
Stealing occurs in the second period after the proceeds Xit have been raised. Thus the
second-period level of stealing maximizes equation (1) without regard for equation (2), and
is characterized by the …rst-order condition
cs (Áit;s it+1)+®it =1 ;
where cs (Áit;s it+1) denotes the derivative of c with respect to sit+1.T h i se q u a t i o ns a y st h a t
at the optimum, the marginal cost of stealing, cs (Áit;s it+1), plus the marginal reduction of
the insiders’ dividends, ®it, is equated with the marginal bene…t of stealing, which equals
one. If the cost-of-stealing function is monotonically increasing, as we assume, then stealing
minority shareholders. For example, foreign investors may be treated di¤erently than domestic investors if
they carry less political clout with law enforcement agencies.
9is monotonically increasing in outside ownership. As in LLSV (1999a), we assume the
functional form c(Áit;s it+1)=1
2Áits2
it+1,i nw h i c hc a s eo p t i m a ls t e a l i n gi sg i v e nb y
sit+1 = Á￿1
it (1￿ ®it).( 3 )
In the language of principal-agenttheory, equation (3) represents the manager’s incentive-
compatibility constraint, and equation (2) represents the investors’ participation constraint.
Both of these constraints must be recognized by the managers and investors in period one
when the choices of ®it, Kit+1; and Cit are made. The manager’s problem is therefore to
choose the vector f®it;s it+1;K it+1;C itg to maximize total expected utility,
u(Cit)+¯Et [u(Cit+1)]; (4)
subject to equations (1), (2), and (3) and the budget constraint, given by
Cit+1 = Nit+1 +(1+rt)Ait; (5)
where Ait = Wit + Xit ￿ Kit+1 ￿ Cit is the manager’s net position in the market asset.
We do not impose any constraints or penalties on the amount of saving or (default-free)
borrowing. It is often argued that debt helps to reduce agency costs because it represents a
harder claim which reduces the free cash ‡ows from which managers can steal. We assume
debt is repaid with probability one. In other words, managers can credibility promise not
to steal from debt holders and therefore riskless debt is frictionless. In this sense, managers
are not borrowing-constrained – debt markets are willing to let managers borrow as much
as they need. Despite this, managers have strong ex ante incentives to use outside equity
because default-free debt cannot be used to diversify the idiosyncratic risk. Thus the burden
of risk sharing falls solely on equity. At the cost of additional complexity, our model could
be generalized to allow risky debt. This might yield additional interesting predictions for
10leverage, but because debt is such a crude instrument for risk sharing, we think it is unlikely
that this would substantially change the qualitative or quantitative predictions of the model
for ownership.
2.1 The Benchmark Case: Perfect Investor Protection
If the manager could contractually commit to the level of stealing in period two (i.e., if
investor protection were “perfect”, so that Áit = 1), it follows immediately from equation
(3) that regardless the level of managerial ownership, the manager would optimally choose
to steal nothing. In this case there is no incentive bene…t from having the managers retain
an equity stake in the …rm, so diversi…cation motives make it optimal to sell 100% of the







=1 ,( 6 )
where ¦K
it+1 = @¦it+1=@Kit+1 is the marginal value of capital. This is the standard …rst-
order condition for the e¢cient choice of capital. To put this equation in more familiar
terms, denote the total return on capital by ¦it = ¼it +( 1￿ ±)Kit,w h e r e¼it denotes the
current level of variable pro…t, ± denotes the rate of physical depreciation on capital, and
(1 ￿ ±)Kit represents the resale value of the capital stock (we maintain the assumption







,w h e r er
f


















it+1 = @¼it+1=@Kit+1 is the marginal pro…t of capital. The right-hand side of this
equation represents the …rm’s “user cost of capital,” which is the sum of the (risk-adjusted)
opportunity cost of funds and depreciation costs. The covariance between the market’s
11SDF and the marginal pro…t of capital (scaled by Et [Mt+1])i sn o n - z e r ot ot h ee x t e n tt h a t
…rm pro…ts are a¤ected by (nondiversi…able) aggregate shocks. For example, if ¼K
it+1 were
negatively correlated with the market’s SDF (i.e., if the …rm had a positive “beta”), its






< 0 would imply a positive risk premium. As usual, idiosyncratic
shocks to ¼K
it+1 (i.e., shocks that are orthogonal to Mt+1)a r en o tp r i c e db e c a u s ei ti sa s s u m e d
they can be costlessly diversi…ed by outside investors. In short, our discussion thus far has
produced the textbook advice for managers: Invest up to the point where the expected
marginal pro…t of capital equals the user cost of capital, where the user cost is adjusted for
nondiversi…able risks (and ignores idiosyncratic risk).
2.2 Imperfect Investor Protection
When investor protection is not perfect (that is, when exogenous costs of stealing are not
in…nite, or Áit < 1), agency con‡icts arise. Such contracting frictions could arise for a
variety of reasons. For example, it could simply be the case that stealing is unobservable.
Even if stealing is observable, however, frictions could still arise because contract enforce-
ment is costly and unreliable. Although the former interpretation is common in the classical
analysis of agency problems, the latter interpretation is a better description of the empirical
setting we have in mind. It easily accommodates interpretations based on the quality of the
exogenous contracting environment as determined by the legal system such as, for example,
laws or judicial traditions which determine the protection of minority shareholders. Such
protections are summarized by the cost-of-stealing parameter, Áit.



















is the SDF for the manager.6 To simplify notation, equation (8) uses:





hit ´ (1 ￿ ®it)(1￿ sit+1); (11)
where sit+1 denotes the optimal (ex-post) level of stealing, which is itself a function: sit+1 =
Á￿1
it (1 ￿ ®it). Note the contrast between mit+1, which is the SDF for the manager, and
Mt+1, which is the SDF for the market. Under complete markets (complete risk-sharing),
t h ec o v a r i a n c ep r o p e r t i e so fMit and mit are the same. In the current setting, however, risk
sharing is incomplete due to the existence of moral hazard, and the covariance properties
of Mit and mit are not the same.























This equation says the risk adjustment to the user cost of capital is the weighted sum of two
terms. The …rst term,
covt[mit+1;¼K
it+1]
Et[mit+1] , re‡ects the covariance between the manager’s SDF
and the marginal pro…t of capital. To the extent that a sizeable fraction of the manager’s
income is derived from the pro…tability of the …rm, the manager’s consumption is exposed to
idiosyncratic risk. In particular, idiosyncratic pro…t shocks increase ¼K
it+1 and consumption,






6The manager is also free to borrow and lend at the rate rt+1 (where rt+1 is possibly stochastic, but
not contingent on the …rm’s pro…ts). We therefore have the usual …rst-order condition for consumption:
Et [mit+1 (1 + rt+1)] = 1.




it+1, hence the approximation




Et[Mt+1] , re‡ects the usual compensation for nondiversi…able risk
(just as in equation (7)). When the equilibrium level of stealing is “small,” then git and
hit approximately equal ®it and 1 ￿ ®it, respectively. Thus the fraction of equity held
by managers reveals the extent to which the user cost of capital applied by the managers
re‡ects idiosyncratic as opposed to systematic risk. When ®it =0 , outside investors own
all of the equity in which case only the systematic risk of the …rm is priced. At the other
extreme, when ®it =1 , the …rm is a proprietorship and the total risk of the …rm is priced
according to the manager’s SDF.
Additional structure on the nature of the above risk premiums is provided by the insiders’
ownership choice. The …rst-order condition for ownership implies:
g®
itEt [mit+1¦it+1]+h®
itEt [Mt+1¦it+1]=0 ; (13)
where g®
it = @git=@®it and h®
it = @hit=@®it. Under our functional form assumptions on the
cost of stealing, g®
it =1￿ sit and h®








Et [mit+1¦it+1] <E t [Mt+1¦it+1]: (15)
This equation says that managers assign a lower value to risky pro…ts than outside investors
do. If investor protection were perfect, the level of stealing would be zero, and these values
would be equal. Under imperfect investor protection, however, managers assign a lower
value to stochastic pro…ts because they discount for idiosyncratic risk, whereas the market,
by contrast, is indi¤erent to this risk. The manager’s ownership choice is nevertheless
privately optimal because the marginal value of reducing idiosyncratic risk exposure by
selling more equity equals the marginal reduction in the market price this would require in
14compensation for the higher rate of equilibrium stealing that would accompany the lower
ownership stake.
If we assume the value function ¦it+1 is homogenous of degree one in the capital stock,
equation (13) can also be used with equation (8) to derive an alternative expression for
the …rst-order condition for capital. Linear homogeneity implies ¦it+1 = Kit+1¦K
it+1,w h i c h


























It follows immediately, that Et [Mt+1¦it+1] > 1. From the market’s perspective, this equa-
tion says that the marginal value of pro…t exceeds its purchase price. That is, in contrast to
the benchmark case of perfect investor protection characterized in equation (6), the manager
is underinvesting.
The magnitude of the “wedge” between the …rst and second best allocations of capital is
roughly proportional to the equilibrium level of stealing, sit. For example, suppose the level
of managerial ownership were ®it =0 :4, which is the median in our sample. Suppose further
that the equilibrium rate of stealing were a (relatively modest) two percent (sit =0 :02).
Then 1
2sit (3 + ®it)=0 :034. That is, such a …rm would invest as if its cost of capital were
about three and a half percentage points higher. Increasing the assumed equilibrium level
of stealing to …ve percent implies a marginal cost of capital of over eight percentage points
higher! Cost of capital di¤erences of this magnitude are large enough to have …rst-order
e¤ects on …rm size and the growth and development of industries and countries. This
15motivates the empirical investigation in the remainder of the paper.
3 Empirical Implications
The primary goal of our empirical work is to investigate the …rst-order condition for capital
in equation (12) or equation (17). In practice, estimation of either equation is complicated
by two issues. First, should we assume that the econometrician observes ¼it+1? Or should we
recognize that perhaps “after-stealing” pro…ts are being reported, (1 ￿ sit)¼it+1? Second,
given that we do not observe stealing, how do we evaluate the expressions for git and hit?
Regarding the measurement of pro…ts, reasonable arguments can be made both ways
depending on whether stealing is deducted from accounting pro…ts. On the one hand, if
self-dealing which takes the form of a manager purchasing input goods from a relative at
in‡ated prices, then the econometrician measures (1 ￿ sit)¼it+1. On the other hand, if
self dealinginvolves stock transactions that bene…t managers at the expense of minority
shareholders, then accounting pro…t is correctly measured. As a practical matter, we are
inclined to think the former is more descriptive in most settings. In this case, equation (12)
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We are still not ready to estimate equation (18) because neither sit nor °it (nor ¡it; for
that matter) is observable in the data. In particular, one cannot calculate the necessary
covariance without observing mit+1, which requires knowing the current and future values
16of the manager’s consumption.
Our empirical investigation is based on equation (12) and proceeds from the assumption
that sit is “small” relative to ®it. This implies git ' ®it,a n dhit ' 1 ￿ ®it: Next, we
model °it and ¡it using variable coe¢cient models in which we assume °it =¹ ° + "
°
it and
¡it = ¹ ¡+"¡
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, we need to consider whether an instrumental variable estimator based
on instruments zit in the time-t information set satis…es E[uitzit]=0 . Given the rational
expectations error !it, and given no reason to expect covariation between "¡
it and ®it,t h e
validity of the moment condition reduces to establishing zero conditional covariance between
®it and "
°
it. This condition is not easy to verify a priori because the covariance depends on
the source of the underlying shocks. In the model, a negative shock to the insiders’ private
wealth would imply a negative reponse of "
°
it (because the marginal utility of wealth is
lower in good states) and a positive response of ®it (because lower risk aversion encourages
more inside ownership). That is, wealth shocks would imply E["
°
it®itjzit] < 0; which would
bias estimates of ¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡ in equation (21) toward zero. Alternatively, the covariance implied
by shocks to investment opportunities would imply a positive correlation and an upward
bias. As a practical matter, ownership stakes tend to evolve slowly, so we are not overly
concerned about the magnitude of the bias in either direction, especially when equation
(21) is estimated using instrumental variables.
174 Empirical Results
4.1 Data
Our empirical investigation uses annual …rm-level data from the Worldscope database, which
contains information on large, publicly traded …rms, and monthly …rm-level stock price data
from Datastream.8 All countries in the Worldscope database (May 1999 Global Researcher
CD) with at least 30 …rms and at least 100 …rm-year observations are included in the sample.
We exclude data from former socialist economies. This results in a sample of 38 countries.
The sample does not include …rms for which the primary industry is either …nancial (one-
digit-SIC code of 6) or service-oriented (one-digit-SIC codes of 7 and above). From this
universe we select three samples. Our …rst sample (the “International Sample”) includes
38 countries with over 6000 …rms for the years 1988-1998. The United States has by far
the largest representation in this sample with over 15,000 …rm-year observations, almost
double the number of the next closest country (the United Kingdom ranks second with
8,338 observations), so to reduce the in‡uence of the United States on the international
sample, we chose a 50% random sample. Our second sample (the “Largest 150 Sample”) is
a proper subset of the …rst sample and includes only the 150 largest …rms from each country
in each year, where the cuto¤ is recalculated for each year. The cuto¤ is binding only for
countries with large …rm populations like the United States, United Kingdom and Japan,
and is intended to re…ne cross-country comparisons among …rms. Our third sample (the
“Non-US/UK Sample”) is a subset of the …rst which excludes …rms from the United States
and the United Kingdom, and is chosen so we can investigate whether results obtained on
t h ea b o v es a m p l e sa r es o m e h o wu n i q u eo rd o m i n a t e db yt h et w oc o u n t r i e sw i t ht h el a r g e s t
…rm populations.
8Worldscope attempts to standardize accounting information to improve cross-country comparability.
For example, if one company reports sales with included excise taxes and another company excludes taxes,
Worldscope corrects this di¤erence and presents both with taxes excluded. This is important for our purposes
because sales is the key ingredient in the measure of the marginal product of capital. It is therefore obviously
desirable that it have as much cross-country comparability as possible.
18We construct a beginning-of-period capital stock variable which is used to construct
investment and sales-to-capital ratios as well as our measure of the marginal product of
capital (see the next section). The most obvious measure, the lagged end-of-period capital
stock, is problematic because mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and similar events give
rise to large, unexplained changes in ratios using capital in the denominator. There is no
easy, systematic way of identifying these transactions in the data, and even if we could,
throwing them out would substantially reduce sample size, so we calculate beginning-of-
period capital stock as the current end-of-period stock minus current period gross investment
plus depreciation.
We also construct …rm-level measures of the variance of idiosyncratic stock returns. We
match monthly stock market data from Datastream to estimate the variance of idiosyncratic
returns for over 90% of our Worldscope …rm-year observations. In the raw data, there are
a few returns which appear to be outliers (e.g., returns below 100%); these are removed by
eliminating values for which the absolute value of returns exceeds 100%; this rule deletes
fewer than one tenth of one percent of the observations, and estimates are not sensitive to
this cuto¤. Our measure of idiosyncratic risk is the variance of the residual from obtained
by regressing monthly …rm-level stock returns on the respective country-level measure of
the market return (the country-level market index is also obtained from Datastream).
Inside ownership concentration is a key variable for analysis. Though it is less than
the ideal measure, we use the Worldscope variable “closely held shares” as our measure of
inside ownership. At the country level, we augment these …rm-level data with three indi-
cators of investor protection which we construct by aggregating the indices of “shareholder
rights,” “creditor rights,” and “legal e¢ciency” assembled by LLSV (1998). The “share-
holder rights” index measures how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders
against managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision-making process. This
index is a sum of seven characteristics, each of which is assigned a value of one if the right
increases shareholder protection, and zero otherwise. The components of this index are: (1)
19one share-one vote rule; (2) proxy by mail; (3) shares not blocked before meeting (in some
countries, the law requires depositing shares with the company several days prior the share-
holder meeting, a practice which prevents shareholders from selling or voting their shares);
(4) cumulative voting/proportional representation; (5) oppressed minority rights (the share-
holder right to challenge director’s decisions in court or force the company to repurchase the
shares from minority); (6) preemptive right to new issues (which protects shareholders from
dilution); and (7) percentage of share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder
meeting.
The “creditor rights” index measures the rights of senior secured creditors against bor-
rowers in reorganizations and liquidations. This index is a sum of four characteristics. The
components of this index are: (1) no automatic stay on assets (which makes it harder for
secured creditors to seize collateral); (2) secured creditors paid …rst; (3) restrictions on going
into reorganization (equal to one for countries that require creditors’ consent to …le for re-
organization); (4) management does not stay in reorganization (equal to one if management
is replaced at the start of reorganization procedure). Finally, the “legal e¢ciency” index is
an assessment of the e¢ciency and integrity of the legal environment as it a¤ects business,
particularly foreign …rms. The index is produced by the country-risk rating agency Business
International Corporation. The value we use is the average between 1980-1993, scaled from
0 to 10, with lower scores for lower e¢ciency levels.
Finally, we delete observations meeting any of the following criteria: (1) three or fewer
years of coverage; (2) zero, negative, or missing values reported for capital expenditures,
capital stock (property, plant, and equipment), sales or closely held shares; (3) investment-
to-capital ratios greater than 2.5 (which is the upper …rst percentile); (4) sales-to-capital
ratios greater than 20 (which is the upper …fth percentile).9 Table 1 reports the number
9The sales-to-capital rule is tighter than might otherwise seem necessary because we want to exclude
…rms for which capital is not an important factor of production. Half of the …rms deleted by this rule were
in the United States and United Kingdom. Another quarter of the deleted …rms were in Japan, France, and
Denmark.
20of …rm-year observations remaining for each country following the application of the above
selection criteria, and Table 2 reports summary statistics for these variables across the three
samples.
Table 1 shows that the number of …rms varies widely across countries. As noted by
LLSV (1997), Worldscope’s coverage of …rms within countries varies widely from as little as
one percent of all listed domestic …rms included (for India) to as many as 82% (for Sweden).
This variation re‡ects several factors. Some countries are simply larger, and therefore have
more …rms. The sample re‡ects the endogenous decision of …rms to go public or remain
private. For example, there are more …rms in countries like the United Kingdom (993 …rms
in the full sample) which have strong legal protection for minority shareholders than there
are in countries like Germany (375 …rms in the full sample), which has a larger economy but
is thought to have weaker shareholder protection. We have fewer observations for countries
like India where, despite a large number of public …rms, many …rms are not actively traded,
and Worldscope presumably does not bother to collect data for such …rms. To the extent
that weak investor protection lowers market liquidity, this presumably weakens the power
of our tests by selecting against the very …rms for which the correlation between inside
ownership and the marginal return on capital would presumably be strongest.
4.2 Measuring the Marginal Pro…t of Capital
Estimation of the model requires a measure of the marginal pro…t of capital. Suppose the
…rm’s production function is Yit = f(Ait;K it;Z it); where Ait is a measure of total factor
productivity, Yit is output, Kit represents the stock of …xed property, plant and equipment,
and Zit is a vector variable factor inputs (e.g., materials, energy, unskilled production
workers, etc.). Assuming that the …rm faces an inverse demand curve P(Yit) and variable
21factor prices wit (in a competitive factor market), the pro…t function is de…ned by
¼(Kit;w it)=m a x
Zit
P(Yit)Yit ￿ witZit (22)
s.t. Yit = f(Ait;K it;Z it): (23)










where ´ ´ (@Y=@P)P=Y <￿1 is the (…rm-level) price elasticity of demand. If the produc-
















and assuming the book value of capital is a reasonable proxy for replacement value, the
marginal pro…t of capital is easily measured using the sales-to-capital ratio.
We allow for the possibility that the scaling factor
¡
1 + ´￿1¢
κ may vary across indus-




each industry by assuming that …rms are, on average, near their equilibrium capital stocks.






' r + ±; (26)
where µj is the industry-speci…c value of 
¡
1 + ´￿1¢
κ, and where r and ± are the average risk-
adjusted required return and depreciation rate of capital, respectively. Replacing population
moments with sample moments over all …rms and years in industry j, a consistent estimate





(r + ±): (27)
We assume r + ± =0 :18 for all industries (results are not sensitive to alternative assump-
tions). Thus, ¼K
it = ￿ µj (PitYit=Kit) is our measure of marginal return to capital.
4.3 The Determinants of Inside Ownership
Our …rst empirical exercise estimates the e¤ect of …rm-level and country-level measures
of investor protection (described above) on inside ownership. In Table 3 we report coe¢-
cient estimates for …ve alternative speci…cations for the determinates of inside ownership
concentration. The …rst three columns use data for the international sample of …rms. To
insure robustness of our results to the possibility of selection bias introduced by the idio-
syncrasies of the Worldscope data, column (4) reports estimates using the largest 150 …rms
in each country. Columns (5) and (6) report results for a third sample intended to check
the robustness of the results to the exclusion of the United States and the United Kingdom.
The results reported in Table 3 broadly support the proposition that ownership concen-
tration is determined by the level of investor protection. For the sake of comparison with
previous work, the speci…cation in column (1) includes only country-level determinants of
investor protection. The coe¢cients on both “legal e¢ciency” and “shareholder protec-
tion” are negative and precisely estimated, as predicted by theory, while the coe¢cient on
“creditor protection” is not statistically di¤erent from zero. These results are consistent
with the results found by LLSV (1998). For the sake of comparison with previous work
on …rm-level determinants of ownership, column (2) excludes country-level determinants.
Following Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), the speci…cation includes the log of
sales, the ratio of sales-to-capital, the ratio of R&D-to-sales, the standard deviation of the
idiosyncratic component of stock returns, two-digit (SIC) industry dummies, and country-
speci…c year dummies. We also include the dummy variable RDDUM which equals unity
23if R&D information is reported. This variable provides an additional discrete indicator of
R&D intensity because R&D is usually not reported when the amount is negligibly small.
Columns (3) and (4) combine country-level and …rm-level determinants both with and with-
out the stock sigma. Columns (5) and (6) repeat the speci…cation in column (4) for the
samples of the largest 150 …rms and the sample excluding …rms from the United States and
United Kingdom, respectively.
The pattern of estimated coe¢cients signs and magnitudes on the …rm-level regressors
is stable across all of the above speci…cations. The estimated coe¢cient on the …rm size
measure (log sales) is negative and statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in all speci-
…cations. There are several reasons why inside ownership concentration might be lower for
large …rms. First, investors in large …rms may enjoy access to better protections. For ex-
ample, there could be economies of scale to monitoring, or large …rms could systematically
operate assets from which wealth is more di¢cult to expropriate. Second, the ratio of …rm
value to the private wealth of insiders could be higher for large …rms, in which case insider
incentives could be optimally provided by smaller ownership stakes. Third, it could be that
the relationship re‡ects the joint endogeneity of …rm size and inside ownership. We o¤er
some numerical calculations illustrating this possibility in section 5.1.
The coe¢cient on the ratio of sales to capital is positive and statistically signi…cant at the
one-percent level in all …ve speci…cations. It is traditional in such regressions to interpret
the sales-to-capital ratio as a measure of asset tangibility, because high ratios implicitly
indicate the presence of intangible assets like …rm-speci…c human capital, technology, or
market power. If intangible assets are easier to divert or steal (perhaps because they are
di¢cult to observe), then this would explain why sales-to-capital is such a strong, positive
predictor of inside ownership. An alternative explanation for the sales-to-capital ratio is
that this correlation arises endogenously because the sales-to-capital ratio is closely related
to the marginal pro…t of capital, and hence re‡ects the relationship in equation (21). This
model prediction is the primary focus of the next section. The desire to control for tangibility
24of assets is also part of the motivation for the inclusion of the R&D-to-sales ratio and the
R&D dummy. This argument predicts a positive coe¢cient. The R&D variables could
also capture idiosyncratic risk which is not measured by the variance of idiosyncratic stock
returns (e.g., peso risk), in which case the predicted coe¢cient would be negative. In
addition, it is likely that R&D is endogenous – …rms with better investor protection would
have an easier time …nancing R&D, in which case R&D, like low inside ownership, would
be an endogenous proxy for good investor protection. This, too, would predict a negative
coe¢cient. The coe¢cient estimates in Table 3 are more consistent with the view that R&D
is a proxy for unmeasured risk or an endogenous indicator of weak investor protection.
The point estimates on our measure of idiosyncratic risk (“stock sigma”) are all negative,
though only the estimate in column (5) for the non-US/UK …rms is statistically di¤erent
from zero. In the model, the ownership choice equates the marginal bene…ts of incentives
and risk sharing; idiosyncratic risk makes it costly for insiders to own equity in the …rm. The
results in Table 3 are consistent with this prediction of the model. Alternative explanations
are possible, however. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that stock price
volatility could also be a proxy for asymmetric information. If ownership concentration
were the result of adverse selection, then the predicted coe¢cient on stock sigma would be
positive rather than negative. According to this view, the coe¢cient on sigma would be
p o s i t i v e ,b u tt h ee s t i m a t e si nT a b l e3a r en e g a t i v e ,h e n c et h ed a t aa r em o r ec o n s i s t e n tw i t h
moral hazard than adverse selection as an explanation for insider ownership concentration.
Of course, these stories are not mutually exclusive; the coe¢cient on sigma could re‡ect
both e¤ects.
In column (3), our preferred speci…cation, the estimated coe¢cients on legal e¢ciency
and shareholder protection are all negative and precisely estimated. These results are
robust to the exclusion of smaller …rms outside the largest 150 …rms in each country. The
negative signs on legal e¢ciency and shareholder protection support the argument in LLSV
(1998) that ownership concentration is a substitute for legal institutions as a mechanism for
25constraining the expropriation of outside equity investors. The economic intuition for the
negative coe¢cient on creditor protection in column (3) is less obvious, but still consistent
with this view; to the extent that debt …nancing is costlier due to weak creditor protection,
…rms may rely more on equity …nancing. Moreover, the coe¢cients on …rm-level variables are
robust to the inclusion of country-level variables, and conversely, the coe¢cients on country-
level variables are not substantively a¤ected by the inclusion of …rm-level variables. Indeed,
the incremental adjusted R2 more than doubles from 0:112 to 0:233 when the speci…cation
using only …rm-level variables in column (2) is expanded to include country-level variables
in column (3).
Finally, it is interesting to compare the results for the full international sample in column
(3) with the samples of in columns (4) and (5). Although there is some overlap in the
samples, it is nevertheless reassuring to note that the results for the full international
sample are robust across the two subsamples.
4.4 The First-Order Condition for the Capital Stock
Table 4 reports the estimated coe¢cient from simple OLS and instrumental variable regres-
sions of the marginal return on investment (¼it) on inside ownership concentration – that
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These regressions produce estimates of
¡
¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡
¢
, which is the average additional risk pre-
mium for bearing idiosyncratic risk (beyond the usual premium ¹ ¡ for bearing systematic
risk, which is absorbed in the constant term and therefore not identi…ed in this speci…ca-
tion). The top half of the table (panel A) reports results using the international sample of
…rms representing 38 countries, while the bottom half (panel B) reports symmetric results
using the subsample that omits …rms from the United States and United Kingdom. All of
26the standard error estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 (like Table 3) re‡ect adjustments
to account for the potential presence of heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation
among observations within a single …rm, and are therefore as conservative as possible. Most
of the speci…cations (as indicated) also include industry and time dummies as controls.
In the …rst column of Table 4, we report OLS estimates obtained from regressing mar-
ginal pro…t on inside ownership excluding any other control variables. For the international
sample in panel A, the estimated value of
¡
¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡
¢
is 0:027with a standard error of 0:006.
In panel B, using only non-US/UK …rms yields a somewhat larger estimate: 0:058; with a
standard error of 0:008. In column (2), some of this explanatory power is absorbed by the
inclusion of country-speci…c year dummies; this only slightly changes the estimated coe¢-
cients in panel A (falling to 0:023 with a standard error of 0:006), but reduces the estimate
in panel B to 0:019 with a standard error of 0:008. In column (3), adding industry dummies
in addition to the year dummies has little additional impact on the ownership coe¢cient
for either sample. Finally, column (4) repeats column (3) using only the 150 largest …rms
in each country. In panel A, this cuts the sample size roughly in half, and reduces the
estimated coe¢cient to 0:018(with a standard error of 0:008). In panel B, the estimated
coe¢cient in column (4) falls slightly from 0:021 to 0:019 with a standard error of 0:008.I n
results not reported in the tables, we …nd similar estimates when we restrict our sample to
…rms from the United States only. The estimated coe¢cients in columns (1) and (2), for
example, are both 0:029 with a standard error of 0:012. The estimates in columns (2), (3),
and (4) are very similar, too. This result is interesting because it suggests that even within
countries, there is enough variation in investor protection at the …rm level to identify the
relationship between ownership and marginal pro…t.10
The OLS results in columns (1)-(4) of Table 4 indicate positive and statistically signi…-
10Within-country variation in investor protection is not the only possible source of variation in ownership
and marginal pro…t. For example, this variation could theoretically arise from unobserved di¤erences in the
total wealth of insides.
27cant estimates of
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ranging from 0:018 to 0:056. We consider three possible reasons
why these estimates might be biased. First, as discussed in section 3, inside ownership is en-
dogenous, raising the potential for bias caused by correlation between inside ownership and
the error term. However, it is important to be clear about the source of the endogeneity and
its implications for the estimation of equation (21). The endogeneity of ®it is not by itself
su¢cient to generate the correlation between ®it and the error term that would bias OLS
estimates. Indeed, this endogeneity is the very source of the predicted correlation between
®it and the expectation of ¼it on which our empirical evidence is based. Moreover, the
rational expectations error introduced by the di¤erence between the actual and expected
value of ¼it is not known at the time ®it is chosen and is therefore orthogonal to ®it.I n
short, the model does not imply any obvious economic sources of correlation between inside
ownership and the error term.
Because our data provide only relatively crude measures of inside ownership, however,
it is likely that the OLS estimates in Table 4 are contaminated by classical measurement
error. In the column (5), we reestimate the speci…cation in column (6) using three lags of all
right-hand side variables as instruments. These estimates are consistent with the existence
of measure error. The instrumental variable estimates increase slightly in panels A and B to
0:033 and 0:045, respectively, with standard errors of 0:009 and 0:011.I nc o l u m n( 6 ) ,w ea d d
the log of sales to control for size e¤ects that might be spuriously correlated with ownership
(although the model identi…es no structural reason for doing so except, perhaps, as a crude
control for cross-sectional di¤erences in depreciation rates or systematic risk). This raises
the estimated coe¢cients in Panels A and B to 0:037 and 0:049, respectively, with standard
errors of 0:010 and 0:011. Finally, as discussed at the end of section 3, our instrumental
variable estimates could correct for bias due to the variable coe¢cient component of the
error term. In particular, the lagged instrument set may be less correlated with the term
involving product of the ownership and the unobserved innovation to the insiders’ SDF
("
°
it®it). Either story would be consistent with the larger coe¢cient magnitudes observed
28for the instrumental variable estimates in Table 4.
4.5 Adjustment Costs and Leverage E¤ects
For simplicity, the speci…cation estimated in Table 4 is derived under the assumption of
zero adjustment costs and frictionless debt markets. Previous research, however, shows that
both adjustment costs and leverage e¤ects are important features of investment behavior
(see Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998, for a recent treatment). It is therefore important to
show that the estimates in Table 4 do not spuriously re‡ect either of these two features
of a more general model. Fortunately, the necessary model extensions can be applied in a
straightforward way to equations (13) and (8), and equation (21) can be modi…ed accord-
ingly.
Adjustment costs can be appended to the existing model by recognizing that the total





it+1 +( 1￿ ±)(1+cit+1)
¢
=(1+ cit)
under adjustment costs, where cit+1 is the marginal adjustment cost of installing an addi-
tional unit of capital. We assume this marginal adjustment cost can be parameterized as
cit+1 = ¿1
¡
(I=K)it+1 ￿ ¿2 (I=K)it
¢
. To add leverage e¤ects to the model, we …rst note that
the model already allows managers to borrow and save freely at the rate rt+1. To allow
for the further possibility that leverage incurs a deadweight loss which is borne by man-
agers, we can make the common and convenient modeling assumption that the borrowing
rate rt+1 includes an additional premium which is linearly increasing in the debt-to-asset
ratio. In this case, r
f
t+1 in equation (28) is replaced by r
f
t+1 + ´(B=K)it (see Gilchrist and
Himmelberg, 1998, for example).
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+b1 (I=K)it+1 + b2 (I=K)it + b3 (I=K)it￿1 + ´(B=K)it + "it+1;
29where b1 = ￿¿1 (1 ￿ ±), b2 = ¿1 (1 + ¿2 (1￿ ±)), b3 = ￿¿1¿2. In the absence of adjustment
costs for investment and costly debt …nancing, the reduced-form coe¢cients b1, b2, b3,a n d´
are zero, and equation (29) reduces to the static …rst-order condition for capital in equation
(8).
We report estimates of the Euler equation in equation (29) in Table 5. These speci…ca-
tions are estimated by instrumental variables where the instrument list consists of lags t￿1,
t ￿ 2,a n dt ￿ 3 of all variables appearing in the model speci…cation being estimated.11 All
speci…cations are estimated with country-speci…c year dummies and industry dummies. For
the sake of comparison with the estimates in Table 4, columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 5
report instrumental variable estimates of our modi…ed Euler equation under the assumption
that adjustment costs are zero (column (1) repeats column (5) from Table 5 exactly). These
estimates reveal that the inclusion of leverage has essentially no impact on the estimated
coe¢cient on inside ownership. In the second column of Panel A, for example, the estimated
coe¢cient on market leverage is ￿0:004, and is not statistically di¤erent from zero. In the
third column of Panel A, using book leverage instead of market leverage yields a precisely
estimated leverage coe¢cient of 0:096, and the coe¢cient on inside ownership rises to 0:041
(from its estimated value of 0:033 r e p o r t e di nt h e… f t hc o l u m no fT a b l e5 ) . I nr e g r e s s i o n
results not reported here, we control for size by including the log of sales; this addition does
not substantively alter the estimated coe¢cients or standard errors on inside ownership.
Finally, the results for the non-US/UK sample reported in Panel B are qualitatively the
same as those in Panel A, except that the coe¢cient estimates for the static model in Panel
B tend to be somewhat larger.
Columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 5 repeat the speci…cations in the …rst three columns
allowing for adjustment costs. Here again, we are primarily interested in noting the impact
on the estimated coe¢cient on inside ownership. The coe¢cients on ownership in the
11The magnitudes of the point estimates are not sensitive to instrument selection; using fewer lags some-
what reduces precision.
30Euler equation estimates in Panel A are uniformly higher than the estimates for the static
speci…cation reported in Table 4 and the …rst three columns of Table 5. For example, in
the column (4) of Panel A, the estimated coe¢cient on inside ownership is 0:052(with a
standard error of 0:023), which is larger though less precisely estimate than the estimate of
0:033(with a standard error of 0:009) reported in the …fth column of Table 5. This estimate
rises to 0:069 (with a standard error of 0:021)i nt h es i x t hc o l u m nw h e nw ea d db o o k
leverage to the speci…cation. Once again, the results for the non-US/UK sample in Panel B
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, indicating that our results are not being driven
by large representation of …rms in the United States and the United Kingdom.
While the comparison between the static and dynamic models reveals only modest di¤er-
ences for the coe¢cient on ownership, it substantially increase both the size and signi…cance
of the estimated coe¢cient on leverage. With adjustment costs, the estimated coe¢cient on
market leverage reported in the sixth column of Panel A rises to 0:264(with a standard error
of 0:030), which, in contrast to the estimate reported in the second column, is now large and
statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The sixth column of Panel A reports a similar
increase in magnitude for the coe¢cient on book leverage with an estimated coe¢cient of
0:239(with a standard error of 0:030). In these two speci…cations, the coe¢cients on inside
ownership remain large and precisely estimated at 0:047and 0:069(with standard errors
of 0:019 and 0:021, respectively). Similar changes in the leverage coe¢cient are observed
in Panel B. In addition to showing the robustness of the results in Table 5, these results
appear to indicate that leverage, too, is correlated with the cost of capital used by insiders
to discount future cash ‡ows. This is consistent with the leverage e¤ects for investment
found by Whited (1992) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), among others.
315 Discussion
5.1 The Magnitude of Capital Stock Distortions
The magnitude of the underinvestment implied by our estimates of ¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡ in Tables 4 and 5
depend on the distortion to the marginal cost of capital, as revealed by the term
¡
¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡
¢
®it,
and the elasticity of the capital stock to the marginal cost of capital. Although it is perhaps
di¢cult to judge the value of this elasticity at the level of the macroeconomy, it is not di¢cult
to make reasonable assumptions at the …rm level. The elasticity depends on the curvature of
the …rm’s pro…t function. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns
to scale, and if the …rm is a price taker in factor and product markets, then the …rm’s pro…t
function is linear in capital, and …rm size is indeterminate. To generate a concave pro…t
function (so that …rm size is bounded), we need to introduce diminishing marginal revenue.
This would be consistent with decreasing returns to scale in production, market power, or
both. For simplicity, we assume constant returns to scale and a downward sloping demand
curve for output given by P (Yit)=Y
￿´
it ,w h e r e￿´ is the inverse price elasticity of demand.
For this demand curve, the pro…t function function has the form ¼it = AitK
1￿´
it ,w h e r eAit
is a “pro…tability” parameter that embeds productivity levels, factor prices, and parameters




it = rf + ± + ¹ ¡+
¡
¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡
¢
®it. (30)
Equation (30) allows us to examine the sensitivity of the capital stock to changes in the user
cost of capital. When investor protection is perfect, equation (30) implies (1 ￿ ´)AitK
￿´
it =
± + r. Abstracting from adjustment costs, the elasticity of capital with respect to the user
cost in this model is ￿1=´. Hence, for example, if ´ =0 :2,t h e n￿1=´ =5 :0,s ot h a ta10%
increase in the user cost of capital implies a 50% decrease in the optimal capital stock.
To illustrate the e¤ect of changes in investor protection on the capital stock, we assume
32parameter values for ´, ±, r,a n d¡, respectively, of 0:2, 0:07, 0:10,a n d0:0.T h ev a l u eo fA is
chosen to normalize K = 100 when investor protection is perfect (this corresponds to ® =0
in equilibrium). Using equation (30), we ask: Given our estimates of ¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡ and plausible
values of the remaining parameters, what is the magnitude of the relationship between the
equilibrium values of ® and K? Table 6 provides the answer for a range of values. For
various values of ®it and ¹ °￿ ¹ ¡, the table reports the implied equilibrium values of marginal
pro…t (¼K
it ) and the associated capital stock (Kit).
Table 6 reveals the quantitative importance of cost of capital distortions for the de-
terminants of …rm size. Even at the low end of our range of estimates (¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡=0 :03), a
…rm with equilibrium ownership concentration of 80% would accumulate only about half
as much capital as a …rm with inside ownership of 10%. The e¤ect is even larger if we use
our preferred estimate of ¹ ° ￿ ¹ ¡=0 :05. At this level, a …rm with ownership concentration
of 80% has an equilibrium capital stock which is 37% of its …rst-best level. These are large
di¤erences. Though our model is stylized, these calculations suggest that ownership concen-
tration (and by implication, investor protection) has an important impact on the marginal
cost of capital.
In related research, Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2001) investigate the determinants
of …rm size and …nd that their measure of judicial e¢ciency is an important explanatory
variable. Thenumerical calculations in Table6 areconsistent with their evidence. Moreover,
these results illustrate the endogeneity of the relationship between …rm size and inside
ownership concentration proposed in section (4.3) as an explanation for the robust empirical
relationship observed in Table 3. The calculations in Table 6 imply a relationship between
ownership concentration and the log of capital is approximately linear with a slope of
roughly ￿1:3, whereas the estimated coe¢cients in Table 3 range from ￿2:44 to ￿3:59.
Hence, the sign is correct and the values from this calibration exercise have the right order of
magnitude. It is tempting to propose a model for …rm size by taking the log of equation (30)
and, rearranging terms, regressing logKit on ownership concentration and other controls for
33other determinants of thecost of capital. Of course, ownership is endogenous, so it wouldnot
be appropriate to interpret ownership as a “determinant” of …rm size. Rather, this regression
would simply recover the negative equilibrium relationship between …rm size and ownership.
Although the negative relationship between ownership and …rm size is a robust feature of
the data, the problem with this proposed regression, unfortunately, is that “pro…tability”
parameter, logAit, appears in the error term. This parameter is highly endogenous to
both …rm size and ownership. Without instrumental variables to account for this omitted
variable, such a regression provides biased estimates of the structural parameters. The
speci…cation in equation (28), by contrast, do not su¤er from this bias.
5.2 Inside Ownership and Tobin’s Q
The marginal value of capital, or marginal q, is the discounted marginal value (to the







Under zero adjustment costs, constant returns to scale, perfectly competitive product mar-
kets, and perfect investor protection, equation (6) says that marginal q equals one in equilib-
rium. It also follows immediately from the discussion of equation (17) that under imperfect
investor protection and linear homogeneity of ¼, the equilibrium value of marginal q exceeds
one. It is an easy algebraic exercise to extend this result to the case where the value function
is homogenous of degree less than one, Ã<1.12
To map these statements about marginal q into statements about Tobin’s average Q,w e
consider the general case where the one-period pro…t function ¼ is homogeneous of degree
Ã<1. Under this assumption, the relationship between marginal q and Tobin’s Q is given
12Homogeneity of degree Ã implies ¼
K = Ã
¼
K. This implication combined with equations (8) and (14) can











In the special case that the pro…t function is linearly homogeneous (Ã =1 ), we have the
familar result that marginal q equals Tobin’s Q. In the general case (Ã<1), equation (32)
implies Qit >q it.I f Ã is a constant, the relationship between Qit and qit is linear. Thus,
under fairly general conditions, weak investor protection implies the equilibrium value of
Tobin’s Q is greater than one. Moreover, by the relationship of marginal q to marginal
pro…t and the logic of equation (21), the model predicts Tobin’s Q is positively related to
inside ownership concentration.
Our model thus provides an alternative explanation some of the results found with
regressions of Tobin’s Q on inside ownership (e.g, MÁrck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; Mc-
Connell and Servaes, 1990; Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan, 1999; and Himmelberg,
Hubbard, and Palia, 1999, among others). A common interpretation for positive estimated
coe¢cients on inside ownership in the above regression is “better incentives generate better
performance.” In this view, high values of Tobin’s Q indicate “good performance,” and
therefore Tobin’s Q should be higher for …rms with “good incentives,” i.e., higher concen-
trations of inside ownership. McConnell and Servaes (1990), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and
Palia (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), however, raise various objections to this
interpretation as well as to the practice of regressing Tobin’s Q on ownership. The primary
complaint is that ownership is endogenous. Our model addresses this problem by providing
an empirical framework within which the consequence of this endogeneity can in principal,
at least, be interpreted. In our model, high values of marginal q re‡ect underinvestment
resulting from low levels of investor protection, which in turn is positively correlated with
ownership concentration. Hence equation (32) turns the traditional interpretation on its
13If ¼ is homogeneous of degree Ã,t h e n¦
K = Ã
¦
K+(1 ￿ Ã)(1￿ ±). Multiplying by M, taking expecations,
and collecting terms gives equation (32).
35head; ownership concentration implies better incentives, but such incentives are necessary
only when investor protection is weak. Ownership concentration and high values of Tobin’s
Q are merely joint symptoms of weak investor protection.
Because of the potential biases introduced by measurement problems with Tobin’s Q
(Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia, 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), we do not attempt
to estimate equation (32). For example, if the …rm’s value function is not homogeneous of
degree one (Ã<1)d u et o ,s a y ,m a r k e tp o w e r ,t h e na v e r a g eQ does not equal marginal q.T h e
discrepancy between the two stems from the fact that average Q values inframarginal rents
on assets in place whereas marginal q concerns only the value of rents on the margin. This
point holds for any other source of inframarginal rents, and applies to inframarginal costs
as well. With …xed costs in production, for example, Tobin’s Q can be less than marginal
q. In short, average Q can easily re‡ect substantial variation which is unrelated to marginal
q. To make matters worse, if inframarginal rents are correlated with unobserved …rm-level
or country-level investor protection variables, then the error term is correlated with the
regressors, and in the absence of good instruments, least squares estimates of equation (32)
are biased downward. By contrast, our adjusted sales-to-capital-based measure of marginal
pro…t is robust to market power, …xed cost, and various other measurement issues that
break the link between average and marginal q.
5.3 Financial Liberalizations
Our results suggest large potential gains from …nancial sector reforms that improve the
level of investor protection. Most research on …nancial liberalization approaches the issue
from an asset-pricing perspective which focuses on changes in the risk-free rate or the price
of systematic risk (or both) as a consequence of improved international diversi…cation. As
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000), among others, have pointed out, however, removing the
barriers to capital ‡ows does not guarantee that capital ‡ows to its most e¢cient use
unless international investors can be credibly convinced that investments will be repaid;
36the expected return to investors depends on the level of investor protection. For example,
the estimates in Chari and Henry (2001) indicate that for a …rm operating in a market in
which the covariance between the local and world market returns exceeds 0.01, …nancial
liberalization causes a …rm-speci…c revaluation on the order of 3.4%. This revaluation
occurs only for “investible …rms”; …rms which are “o¤ limits to foreign investors” bear no
signi…cant relationship to di¤erences in local and world covariances.
The model in this paper formalizes this idea by providing quantitative guidance on the
extent to which …rms are “o¤ limits” to investors. Recall from equation (12) that the























If …nancial liberalization improves international diversi…cation, this implies a change in
the stochastic properties of the market’s SDF, Mt+1, which would change the risk-free
rate, r
f




investor protection were perfect, then we would have git =0and hit =1 ,i nw h i c hc a s et h e
only mechanism by which …nancial liberalization could a¤ect investment would be through
changes in the risk-free rate and the repricing of systematic risk.
Under imperfect investor protection, however, the weight given to idiosyncratic risk is
re‡ected by the level of inside ownership. In the polar case for which investor protection is
so weak that owners are autonomous (git =1 , hit =0 ), the e¤ects of …nancial liberalization
on investment would have to operate indirectly through the e¤ects on the risk-free rate or
the market’s SDF caused by capital ‡ows out of the country.14 More generally, equation
(33) describes a range of intermediate cases for which the weights git and hit fall somewhere
between zero and one.
14Even for a privately held …rm, the equilibrium properties of the manager’s SDF could change due to
changes in the manager’s portfolio opportunities. These e¤ects are indirect, though, and would likely be
smaller than the direct e¤ect on covariance risk for a publicly traded …rm with a low level of inside ownership.
37Equation (33) therefore provides an empirical framework for distinguishing the diversi…-
cation bene…ts from the investor protection reforms that often (to some extent) accompany
…nancial market liberalizations. Intriguingly, and consistent with the evidence reported in
Chari and Henry (2001), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) …nd that the pre-existence
of an Anglo-Saxon legal system magni…es the response of the investment-to-GDP ratio to
…nancial liberalization events. This is precisely what the model presented in this paper
predicts.
6 Conclusions
We investigate the cost of capital in a model in which investor protection determines the
agency con‡ict between inside managers and outside shareholders. Our principal empirical
results con…rm two predictions of the model. First, the weaker is investor protection, the
higher is the concentration of inside equity ownership. Second, the higher is the concentra-
tion of inside ownership, the higher is the implied cost of capital. While previous research
has investigated the determinants of ownership structure, we are not aware of previous
research that has identi…ed the theoretical and empirical relationship between ownership
and marginal pro…t. Our results are robust to extensions of the empirical speci…cation
that explicitly accommodate adjustment costs for investment and …nancial frictions due to
leverage. Moreover, these results hold both for our full sample of …rms across 38 countries
as well as for various subsamples of …rms. The logic linking inside ownership to the cost of
capital is quite general, and the robustness and pervasiveness of these empirical patterns
provide broad support for the predictions of the model.
We have highlighted several interesting implications of our results. First, our results sug-
gest that the magnitude of the departure from the …rst-best level of capital is potentially
quite large for …rms in countries in which investor protection is weak. Even in countries like
the United States and the United Kingdom in which investor protections are good, many
38…rms maintain high concentrations of inside ownership. This fact suggests there is still
substantial room for improvement in the design of the legal and regulatory environment for
…nancial contracting and corporate governance even in what are commonly thought to repre-
sent “best practice.” Second, our model combines what Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2001)
have termed the “technological” and “organizational” theories of the …rm. We provide new
evidence consistent with the view that “organizational” factors (like investor protection)
are important determinants of …rm size. Third, we have formally argued that because weak
investor protection leads to underinvestment, the marginal pro…t of capital is not driven
down to its …rst-best level and therefore Tobin’s Q is greater than one in equilibrium. In
addition, because inside ownership concentration is higher under weak investor protection,
the equilibrium relationship between inside ownership and Tobin’s Q is positive. Subject to
quali…cations regarding possible discrepancies between average and marginal Q,t h e s er e -
sults provide a new interpretation for ownership-performance correlations which di¤ers from
previous explanations. Fourth, our model helps to shed light on the real economic e¤ects of
…nancial liberalizations. In particular, it helps to formalize the widely recognized fact that
while lowering international barriers to capital ‡ows is obviously a necessary condition for
liberalization, it is not su¢cient; capital will not ‡ow unless adequate investor protections
are in place. Existing empirical work already provides evidence for this intuition which is
succinctly captured by our expression for the cost of capital.
These results suggest several important directions for additional research. First, our
data do not allow us to distinguish cleanly between insiders and large but passive outside
shareholders. To the extent that we mistakenly classify large outsiders as insiders, we likely
introduce measurement error and thus a downward bias in the estimated distortion to the
cost of capital. Improving the measurement of the equity holdings and risk exposures of
insiders is an important direction for additional work. Second, we have made ownership of
dividend rights endogenous without considering the endogenous allocation of control rights.
The large gaps between ownership and control rights observed in many countries suggests
39the importance of such an extension. Third, our empirical results show that leverage,
like inside ownership, is positively correlated with the marginal pro…t of capital.15 The
treatment of debt in our framework could be relaxed by making it defaultable rather than
riskless, and would ideally identify the structural role of creditor protections, in particular.
Such a model would obviously be useful for re…ning our theoretical understanding of what
is already a well-documented empirical relationship between leverage and the implied cost
of capital.
15Heaton and Lucas (2001) explore the implications for hurdle rates in a model with debt constraints and
no equity.
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44Country # Obs.  # Firms
Median           
Inside Equity 
Ownership # Obs # Firms
Median    
Inside Equity 
Ownership
Argentina 39 9 0.61 39 9 0.61
Australia 1,370 187 0.41 1,293 169 0.40
Austria 126 38 0.55 126 38 0.55
Belgium 394 62 0.60 394 62 0.60
Brazil 350 75 0.48 340 65 0.48
Canada 839 241 0.31 515 118 0.37
Chile 352 55 0.60 352 55 0.60
Denmark 548 102 0.20 548 102 0.20
Finland 506 72 0.42 506 72 0.42
France 2,537 363 0.63 1,078 173 0.55
Germany 2,393 375 0.67 748 97 0.61
Hong Kong 777 129 0.52 777 129 0.52
India 115 35 0.51 109 33 0.51
Indonesia 409 83 0.70 409 83 0.70
Ireland 369 44 0.26 369 44 0.26
Israel 37 13 0.54 37 13 0.54
Italy 512 108 0.61 512 108 0.61
Japan 3,170 588 0.38 1,098 175 0.34
Malaysia 1,278 195 0.51 1,113 180 0.51
Netherlands 689 124 0.47 689 124 0.47
Norway 539 79 0.50 539 79 0.50
Pakistan 70 15 0.63 70 15 0.63
Peru 13 5 0.83 13 5 0.83
Philippines 25 21 0.65 25 21 0.65
Portugal 156 33 0.56 156 33 0.56
Singapore 713 111 0.58 713 111 0.58
South Africa 1,050 130 0.57 1,050 130 0.57
South Korea 720 184 0.26 612 160 0.26
Spain 539 94 0.57 539 94 0.57
Sweden 773 116 0.41 773 116 0.41
Switzerland 537 112 0.44 537 112 0.44
Taiwan 69 33 0.15 69 33 0.15
Thailand 164 84 0.46 148 81 0.44
Turkey 65 16 0.75 65 16 0.75
United Kingdom 8,338 993 0.25 1,548 227 0.01
United States-50% 7,821 1,187 0.19 1,488 212 0.02
United States 19,256 2,562 0.19 1,566 300 0.01
Total 38,714 6165 0.40 19709 3348 0.42
Note: "United States-50%" is a random 50 percent sample of full United States sample.
Table 1
Full Sample Largest 150 Firms (each year)
Source: Authors' calculations based on Worldscope data.










Stock Sigma Variance of residual from CAPM regression
Variable Sample # obs Mean Min 5% 50% 95% Max
Sales/Capital Full 38,714 4.430 0.000 0.430 3.490 12.330 19.990
Largest 150  19,709 3.940 0.000 0.410 2.980 11.450 19.990
Non-US/UK 24,349 4.342 0.000 0.433 3.425 12.030 19.989
MPK Full 38,714 0.200 0.000 0.040 0.160 0.460 1.000
Largest 150  19,709 0.180 0.000 0.040 0.150 0.440 1.000
Non-US/UK 24,349 0.193 0.000 0.039 0.162 0.453 0.998
I/K Full 38,714 0.240 0.000 0.030 0.180 0.660 2.000
Largest 150  19,709 0.240 0.000 0.030 0.180 0.630 2.000
Non-US/UK 24,349 0.244 0.000 0.031 0.185 0.661 2.000
Book Leverage Full 38,714 0.540 0.000 0.200 0.550 0.840 1.000
Largest 150  19,709 0.550 0.010 0.210 0.560 0.840 1.000
Non-US/UK 24,349 0.548 0.000 0.213 0.558 0.847 1.000
Market Leverage Full 38,714 0.450 0.000 0.110 0.440 0.830 1.000
Largest 150  19,709 0.470 0.000 0.120 0.460 0.870 1.000
Non-US/UK 24,349 0.462 0.001 0.119 0.448 0.842 1.000
Inside Ownership Full 38,714 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.390 0.840 1.000
Largest 150  19,709 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.430 0.840 1.000
Non-US/UK 24,349 0.45 0.000 0.004 0.453 0.900 1.000
Log(Sales) Full 38,632 12.670 1.940 9.830 12.540 15.880 18.930
Largest 150  19,677 13.340 1.940 10.260 13.320 16.370 18.930
Non-US/UK 24,349 12.669 1.153 9.780 12.500 15.921 18.590
R&D/Sales Full 38,714 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 8.820
Largest 150  19,709 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.050 3.650
Non-US/UK 24,349 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 7.197
R&D Dummy Full 38,714 0.610 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Largest 150  19,709 0.650 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Non-US/UK 24,349 0.68 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Stock Sigma Full 34,892 0.11 0.026 0.057 0.100 0.195 0.412
Largest 150  16,914 0.103 0.026 0.055 0.093 0.183 0.390
Non-US/UK 22,265 0.107 0.026 0.059 0.098 0.185 0.390
The ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets
The ratio of the book value of debt to the market value of assets
The fraction of equity held by insiders (in Worldscope, the variable "closely held shares")
Table 2
The log of firm sales, where sales is measured in constant U.S. dollars
Definitions and Summary Statistics for Firm-Level Variables
Percentiles
The ratio of R&D expenditures to sales
A dummy variable equal to one if R&D is missing, zero otherwise
Variable Definition
Summary Statistics
The ratio of firm sales to the beginning-of-period capital stock
The industry-adjusted measure of the marginal return on capital (see Appendix A)
The ratio of capital expenditures to the beginning-of-period capital stockVariables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country-Level 
Characteristics
Legal Efficiency -2.94 ** -2.40 ** -2.21 ** -2.02 ** -1.47 **
(0.21) (0.21)  (0.24)   (0.26) (0.24)
Creditor Protection 0.38   -0.73 ** -0.65 ** -0.08 -0.17
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.38) (0.32)
Shareholder Protection -6.20 ** -5.90 ** -5.81 ** -3.16 ** -2.05 **
(0.23) (0.24) (0.28) (0.38) (0.32)
Firm-Level 
Characteristics
Log(Sales) -2.51 ** -2.97 ** -3.14 ** -3.59 ** -2.44 **
(0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.28) (0.24)
Sales/Capital 0.50 ** 0.42 ** 0.35 ** 0.32 ** 0.56 **
(0.08) (0.07) (0.80) (0.12) (0.10)
R&D/Sales -9.66 ** -9.11 ** -9.45 ** -14.76 -4.70 *
(3.01) (2.76) (3.17) (11.10) (2.10)
R&D Dummy 10.09 ** 5.94 ** 6.18 ** 8.57 ** 6.87 **
(0.62)  (0.59)   (0.63) (0.97)   (0.83)
Stock Sigma -10.70 -13.40 -36.10 **
(7.90) (12.86) (11.23)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.167 0.112 0.243 0.233 0.227 0.125
Nobs 38714 38634 38632 34812 16887 19339
Table 3
Determinants of Inside Ownership Concentration
Coefficients from regressions of inside ownership on country-level and firm-level measures of investor protection.  Constant 
terms are not reported.  Standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. 





Firms Full International Sample(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside Ownership 0.027 *** 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.018 *** 0.033 *** 0.037 ***




Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 NA NA
Nobs 38,716 38,716 38,716 19,711 19,330 19,327
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside Ownership 0.058 *** 0.019 ** 0.021 *** 0.019 ** 0.045 *** 0.049 ***




Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.001 NA NA




Estimates of the First-Order Condition for the Capital Stock
Coefficients from regressions of the marginal return on capital (MPK) on inside ownership (equation (11) in the paper). 
Constant terms and dummy variables are not reported. Column (2) repeats columns (1) adding country-specific time 
dummies, and column (3) repeats column (2) adding industry dummies. Column (4) repeats column (3) using the sample 
of the 150 largest firms in each country.  Column (5) repeats column (3) using three lags of all variables as instruments. 
Column (6) adds the log of sales to column (5). Standard errors (in parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity and within-
firm serial correlation. Statistical significance levels are denoted by stars, where ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
one-, five- and ten-percent levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).
Panel A:  International Sample (All Firms)
Panel B:  Non-US/UK SampleEstimates of Euler Equations and Leverage Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside Ownership 0.033 *** 0.033 *** 0.041 *** 0.052 *** 0.047 *** 0.069 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021)
Market Leverage -0.004 0.264 ***
(0.010) (0.030)
Book Leverage 0.096 ** 0.239 ***
(0.011) (0.030)
(I/K)t+1 -2.942 *** -2.123 *** -2.360 ***
(1.147) (0.825) (0.934)
(I/K)t  5.204 *** 4.103 *** 4.382 ***
(1.196) (0.859) (0.963)
(I/K)t-1 -1.289 *** -1.013 *** -1.099 ***
(0.214) (0.156) (0.170)
Nobs 19,330 19,330 19,327 14,753 14,753 14,752
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inside Ownership 0.045 *** 0.049 *** 0.049 ** 0.035 a 0.047 * 0.041 *
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022)
Market Leverage 0.015 0.215 ***
(0.014) (0.041)
Book Leverage 0.111 *** 0.191 **
(0.015) (0.036)
(I/K)t+1 -1.557 ** -1.790 ** -1.520 **
(0.741) (0.840) (0.698)
(I/K)t  3.519 *** 3.530 *** 3.330 ***
(0.753) (0.850) (0.709)
(I/K)t-1 -0.784 *** -0.756 *** -0.734 ***
(0.131) (0.147) (0.122)
Nobs 11,361 10,408 11,361 8,421 7,658 8,421
Table 5
Model extensions to the regression of the marginal return on capital (MPK) on inside ownership (equation (11) in 
the paper). Column (1) reproduces  model (5) from Table 4 for comparison. Columns (2) and (3) add leverage, 
measured as the ratio of the book value of total liabilities to total liabilities plus equity (using the market and book 
values of equity, respectively). Columns (4)-(6) report Euler equation estimates to capture dynamics in MPK 
resulting from adjustment costs. All specifications are estimated with industry- and country-specific year dummies, 
and all use three lags of the dependent and explanatory variables as instrumental variables. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) adjust for heteroscedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. Statistical significance levels are 
denoted by stars, where ***, ** and * denote significance at the one-, five- and ten-percent levels, respectively 
(two-tailed tests).
Dynamic (Euler Equation) Specifications Static (Steady-State) Specifications
Panel A:  International Sample (All Firms)
Static (Steady-State) Specifications Dynamic (Euler Equation) Specifications
Panel B:  U.S. SampleĮ    ʌ
K       K    ʌ
K       K    ʌ
K       K   
0.00 0.180 100.00 0.180 100.00 0.180 100.00
0.01 0.180 99.17 0.181 98.62 0.181 98.07
0.10 0.183 92.06 0.185 87.19 0.187 82.63
0.30 0.189 78.35 0.195 67.02 0.201 57.59
0.80 0.204 53.48 0.220 36.66 0.236 25.81
Table 6
Equilibrium magnitude of underinvestment implied by observed ownership 
concentration under alternative values of the idiosyncratic risk premium, Ȗ-ī
Solutions for ʌ
K and K assuming Ș=0.2, r+į+ī=0.18, and values for Į and Ȗ-ī as 
indicated in the respective row and column headings. The value of the "profitability" 
parameter A is chosen to normalize K equal to 100 in the benchmark case in which 
perfect investor protection (i.e., Į=0).
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